

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

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SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00 NSC-05 BIB-01 ERDE-00 EB-07

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INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 3493

NOFORN

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: DRAFT GUIDANCE ONOPTION III AND RELATED ITEMS

REF: A. USNATO 3453 DTG 261830Z JUNE 75

B. MBFR VIENNA 314

C. STATE 161676

D. STATE 149343

E. STATE 162110

1. MISSION BELIEVES THAT NATO AND USG WORK ON OPTION III CAN NOW
FOCUS EXCLUSIVELY ON DRAFT GUIDANCE TO THE AHG AND THE SUPPLEMENT,
AND SHOULD PROCEED SIMULTANEOUSLY ON THREE FRONTS:

--GENERAL DISCUSSION IN SPC;

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WORK IN THE OPEN-ENDED CAUCUS ON THOSEISSUES BETTER HANDLED
IN MORE TECHNICALLY ORIENTED BODY;

--UNILATERAL PREPARATION OF U.S. POSITION AND POINT PAPERS ON
RELATED ISSUES.

2. PREPARATION AND CONSIDERATION OF PUBLIC PRESENTATION AND TIMING PAPERS SHOULD BE DEFERRED UNTIL AFTER DRAFT GUIDANCE AND SUPPLEMENTS ARE NEAR COMPLETION. NAC APPEARED IN AGREEMENT IN ITS JUNE 27 MEETING THAT PUBLIC PRESENTATION PAPER WOULD BE NEEDED, BUT THAT ITS PREPARATION SHOULD BE DEFERRED.

3. MISSION BELIEVES USDEL APPROACH REPORTED IN REF B PROVIDES USEFUL MATERIAL FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUPPLEMENT. COMMENTS FOLLOW SEPTTEL. MISSION WOULD NOT FAVOR TABLING A SUPPLEMENTAL TEXT IN TOTO, BUT ONLY OF THOSE SECTIONS OF TEXT WHICH DISCUSSION OF DRAFT GUIDANCE REVEALS TO BE NECESSARY FOR TREATMENT IN SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT.

4. AS DELEGATION POINTS OUT, THERE MAY BE STILL OTHER ISSUES THAT REQUIRE ATTENTION IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE ALLIED AGREEMENT ON DRAFT GUIDANCE. MISSION BELIEVES THE U.S. SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ADDRESS THE FULL RANGE OF MATTERS WHICH HAVE ARISEN TO DATE IN THE SPC AND OTHER RELATED DISCUSSIONS WITH ALLIES.

5. A LIST OF CURRENT ISSUES AND MISSION PROPOSAL FOR DEALING WITH THEM FOLLOWS:

I. CONTENT

A. WHAT ARE THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE WITHDRAWAL AND SUBSEQUENT LIMITATION OF THE OPTION III ELEMENT?
--THIS ISSUE SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN THE SUPPLEMENT BY A SUMMARY REFERENCE TO THE SHAPE ASSESSMENT. SHAPE VIEWS ARE EXPECTED BY MC ON JUNE 30 AND COULD BE IN THE HANDS OF THE SPC BY ABOUT 10 JULY. AFTER SPC DISCUSSION, DRAFTING OF SUMMARY LANGUAGE WOULD TAKE PLACE IN CAUCUS. REQUEST THAT WASHINGTON PREPARE A SHORT STATEMENT, POSSIBLY DRAWING UPON THE NUNN NUCLEAR REPORT, FOR USE IN THE EVENT ALLIES DESIRE FURTHER ELABORATION IN THE SUPPLEMENT ON THE IMPACT OF OPTION III ON DETERRENCE.

B. CAN WARHEADS RETURNED TO U.S. CONTROL AS A RESULT OF POC CHANGES BE WITHDRAWN AS PART OF THE REDUCTION PACKAGE, OR
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WILL THE 1,000 WARHEADS BE COMPRISED ONLY OF "THOSE AVAILABLE FOR USE BY U.S. UNITS?"

--WE BELIEVE THAT RECEIPT OF REF C RESOLVES THIS PROBLEM, AND CAN BE REFLECTED IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE SUPPLEMENT. IF WARHEAD ISSUE REQUIRES FURTHER WORK WE WOULD HANDLE IT IN THE CAUCUS. NO FURTHER GUIDANCE REQUIRED.

C. WOULD SOME QRA AIRCRAFT BE REDUCED IN CONNECTION WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF 54 U.S. F-4'S?

--THIS ISSUE MAY ARISE IN THE COURSE OF EITHER SPC OR CAUCUS DISCUSSION, AND MAY REQUIRE TREATMENT IN THE SUPPLEMENT.

MENT. WE WOULD SEEK TO RESTRICT DISCUSSION TO THE CAUCUS.
REQUEST WASHINGTON PREPARE INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE IN THE SPC OR
THE CAUCUS ADDRESSING BOTH TARGET COVERAGE AND THE POSSIBILITY
OF ACTUAL REDUCTION OF QRA AIRCRAFT.

D. HOW QUICKLY COULD THE WITHDRAWN U.S. F-4S BE RETURNED
TO EUROPE?

--WE BELIEVE THIS ISSUE OF THE STATE OF READINESS OF
U.S. AIRCRAFT IN THE U.S. SHOULD NOT BE DEALT WITH IN EITHER
THE GUIDANCE OR THE SUPPLEMENT. REQUEST THAT WASHINGTON PREPARE
INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT FOR ORAL USE IN THE SPC OR CAUCUS.

E. HOW CAN UNDESIRABLE PRECEDENT-SETTING EFFECTS OF OPTION
III FOR PHASE II BE AVOIDED?

--THE FRG AND OTHERS ARE CONCERNED THAT THE EAST WILL
CITE U.S. NUCLEAR WITHDRAWALS IN PHASE I AS A PRECEDENT FOR
FURTHER NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II. WE BELIEVE THIS ISSUE
IS CERTAIN TO ARISE IN SOME FORM IN THE SPC. WE WOULD MAINTAIN
THAT PARA 9 OF THE U.S. DRAFT GUIDANCE IS ADEQUATE TO MEET THIS
POINT, BUT WE WILL NEED FURTHER WASHINGTON GUIDANCE AS TO WHAT,
IF ANYTHING, WE COULD AGREE TO SAY IN THE SUPPLEMENT.

II . OBJECTIVES

F. HOW SHOULD THE COMMITMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING IN
PHASE I BE SPECIFIED?

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--THE LANGUAGE IN PARAGRAPH ONE OF THE U.S. DRAFT GUIDANCE
SHOULD GO A LONG WAY TO MEETING THE UK CONCERN. THE UK MAY,
HOWEVER, INTRODUCE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE TO "APPROPRIATELY
DEFINE" THE COMMON CEILING. IF SO, THIS MATTER SHOULD BE DEALT
WITH IN THE SPC, AND ANY FURTHER AGREED DEFINITION SHOULD BE
PLACED IN THE SUPPLEMENT. FURTHER WASHINGTON GUIDANCE WILL BE
NEEDED AS THIS ISSUE DEVELOPS.

G. SHOULD EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE ALLIED POSITION ON
PHASING BE INTEGRATED INTO THE NATO STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES
SOUGHT IN EXCHANGE OF OPTION III?

--WE AGREE WITH REF B THAT PARAGRAPH TWO OF THE DRAFT GUIDANCE
ADEQUATELY COVERS THIS POINT. HOWEVER, THE FRG MAY WANT TO
CHANGE THE LANGUAGE IN PARAGRAPH ONE OF THE DRAFT GUIDANCE TO
FURTHER INTEGRATE PHASING INTO THE OBJECTIVES. IF SO, WE
WOULD HOPE TO KEEP SUCH DISCUSSION IN THE SPC. REQUEST WASHINGTON
GUIDANCE ON WHETHER "PHASING" COULD BE SPECIFIED AS AN
OBJECTIVE.

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H. SHOULD THE ALLIES DEMAND SOVIET WITHDRAWAL OF THE
NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE TANK ARMY?
--THIS ISSUE MAY REQUIRE ELABORATION IN THE SUPPLEMENT.
WE PROPOSE TAKING THE POSITION THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD CONTINUE
TO SEEK WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY IN MAJOR UNITS
INCLUDING THEIR ARMAMENTS BUT SHOULD REQUIRE SUBSEQUENT LIMITATION
ONLY OF SOVIET GROUND AND AIR FORCES MANPOWER AND TANKS. NO
GUIDANCE REQUIRED.

III. CEILINGS

I. SHOULD THE ALLIES SEEK LIMITATIONS ON NSWP TANKS?
--IF THIS ISSUE IS RAISED, IT SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE
SPC. THE SUBJECT CAN BE DEALT WITH IN THE SUPPLEMENT, IF THE U.S.
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POSITION THAT SUCH LIMITATIONS SHOULD NOT BE SOUGHT IS SUSTAINED.
HOWEVER, IF THE ALLIES SEEK SUCH LIMITATIONS, THE ISSUE WOULD
HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED IN THE GUIDANCE. NO FURTHER GUIDANCE NEEDED NOW.

J. SHOULD LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET NUCLEAR SYSTEMS ANALOGOUS
TO THOSE WITHDRAWN BY THE U.S. BE FURTHER DENIED?

-THIS QUESTION WILL LIKELY REQUIRE EXTENSIVE NATO DISCUSSION. IT MAY PROVE NECESSARY TO EXPAND ON OUR MEANING OF "IN SUCH A WAY AS TO UNDERMINE THE BASIS OF THE AGREEMENT" IN THE SUPPLEMENT. IF SO, THE DETAILED DISCUSSION AND DRAFTING OF SUCH A DEFINITION SHOULD BE DONE IN THE CAUCUS ON THE BASIS OF GUIDELINES WORKED OUT IN THE SPC. REQUEST WASHINGTON GUIDANCE ON HOW THIS LIMITATION MIGHT BE FURTHER SPECIFIED FOR ALLIANCE UNDERSTANDING.

K. HOW CAN THE ALLIES AVOID SOVIET DEMANDS THAT U.S. NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN AREAS NEIGHBORING THE NGA BE LIMITED?

--WE WILL ARGUE IN THE SPC THAT THE U.S. DOES NOT INTEND TO BE SO LIMITED, BUT THAT A PROPER ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION MUST AWAIT ALLIANCE DECISIONS ON HUNGARY AND ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION. IF THE ALLIES INSIST ON WORKING OUT LANGUAGE ON THIS POINT, SUCH LANGUAGE WOULD GO IN THE SUPPLEMENT. WE WOULD EXPECT DISCUSSION TO REMAIN IN THE SPC. REQUEST WASHINGTON GUIDANCE. WE RECOMMEND THAT ANY GUIDANCE ON THIS ISSUE SEEK TO AVOID PREMATURE ALLIED CONSIDERATION OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION ISSUE, WHICH WOULD INVOLVE ALLIES IN EXTREMELY TIME-CONSUMING EXERCISE.

L. HOW WILL THE "IDIALOGUE" REFERRED TO IN THE U.S. PAPER CONCERNING FOLLOW-ON AIRCRAFT AND TANK MODELS BE CARRIED OUT?

--WE WILL ATTEMPT IN SPC DISCUSSION TO MAINTAIN THAT IT IS PREMATURE TO DISCUSS FURTHER DETAILS. FAILING THAT, WE WOULD ATTEMPT TO USE THE CAUCUS TO DRAFT AN EXPLANATORY PARAGRAPH ON A "FOLLOW-ON ARRANGEMENT" WHICH RETAINS U.S. FLEXIBILITY. GUIDANCE ON WHAT SUCH A PARAGRAPH MIGHT SAY WOULD BE APPRECIATED. DUTCH DELEGATION HAS JUST ASKED US IF WE HAVE ANYTHING MORE SPECIFIC IN MIND OF THIS SUBJECT. WE BELIEVE SOME ALLIES MIGHT WANT AT LEAST AN INTERNAL ALLIED UNDERSTANDING.

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M. WHAT CONSTRAINTS ON ALLIANCE ARMAMENTS COULD BE ACCEPTED IF IT BECOMES NECESSARY TO FALL BACK FROM THE STATED POSITIONS?

--THE UK AND FRG MAY WISH TO PURSUE DISCUSSION OF THIS DELICATE QUESTION. HOWEVER, THE BRITISH HAVE INDICATED THAT AN INFORMAL STUDY BY U.S, FRG, AND UK DEALING WITH IMPLICATIONS OF LIMITATIONS ON ALLIED AIRCRAFT PROGRAMS WOULD BE SATISFACTORY FOR THEIR PURPOSES. THE FRG HAS INDICATED THAT SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD BE HELPFUL. WE WILL ATTEMPT TO KEEP ANY SUCH DISCUSSION IN AN INFORMAL BODY AND AVOID WRITTEN ALLIED ADDRESSEAL IN EITHER THE AHG GUIDANCE OR THE SUPPLEMENT. WE BELIEVE THAT WOULD BE PRUDENT FOR WASHINGTON TO (1) DRAFT INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS SUBJECT WHICH MIGHT BE SHOWN BILATERALLY TO SELECTED ALLIES OR, IF NECESSARY, USED IN THE CAUCUS, AND (2) PREPARE A PAPER OUTLINING PROJECTED USAF AIRCRAFT DEPLOYMENTS

IN THE NGA FROM 1975 TO 1980 WHICH WE COULD USE WITH ALLIES.

IV. AIR MANPOWER

N. SHOULD THE PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE AIR MANPOWER IN THE COMMON CEILING BE PRESENTED TO THE EAST PRIOR TO, CONCURRENTLY WITH, OR AFTER PRESENTATION OF OPTION III?

--THIS QUESTION SHOULD BE FURTHER ADDRESSED IN THE GUIDANCE AND WILL PROBABLY BE DISCUSSED IN THE SPC. USG STATED PREFERENCE IN REF E PROVIDES ADEQUATE GUIDANCE. WE INTEND TO PROPOSE SPC AGREEMENT ON US PREFERENCE AT TACTICALLY APPROPRIATE TIME

O. IN WHAT WAY WOULD AIR MANPOWER BE INCLUDED IN THE COMMON CEILING?

THE MBFR WORKING GROUP HAS ENGAGED IN SEVERAL STUDIES ON TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THIS SUBJECT. THE SPC WILL PRESUMABLY DRAW ON THESE STUDIES AS A BASIS FOR ASSESSING THE IMPLICATIONS OF INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN THE COMMON CEILING. ANY ALLIED DECISIONS ON SUB-CEILINGS COULD BE EMBODIED IN THE SUPPLEMENT. WE BELIEVE U.S. ABILITY TO ACCEPT AN ILLUSTRATIVE SUB-CEILING OF 700,000 ON GROUND FORCES WITHIN AN ILLUSTRATIVE OVERALL COMBINED AIR AND GROUND COMMON CEILING OF 900,000 WOULD ASSURE FRG ACCEPTANCE, AND WOULD HELP GAIN EARLY ALLIED APPROVAL. REQUEST GUIDANCE INCLUDING ADDRESSAL OF SUB-CEILING ISSUE.

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